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Promotion of healthy food and beverage purchases: 
are subsidies and consumer education sufficient? 
Poor diet accounts for a larger global burden of non-
communicable disease than tobacco, alcohol, and 
physical inactivity combined.1 Furthermore, the burden 
of non-communicable disease is substantially higher 
in socioeconomically disadvantaged communities. 
There is, therefore, an urgent need to identify the most 
effective and cost-effective interventions to minimise 
poor diet, by increasing the intake of healthy food and 
reducing the intake of sugar-sweetened beverages and 
junk foods that are high in salt, sugar, and saturated 
fats. The randomised controlled trial of dietary subsidies 
in socioeconomically disadvantaged communities 
by Julie Brimblecombe and colleagues,2 published in 
The Lancet Public Health, is therefore of potentially 
great interest. Using a stepped wedge trial design, 
Brimblecombe and colleagues randomly assigned 
20 stores serving small indigenous communities across 
the rural Australian Northern Territories to apply 
in-store price discounts with or without consumer 
education. The stores implemented a 20% discount 
on fruit, vegetables, bottled water, and artificially 
sweetened soft drinks for 24 weeks. The effect of the 
discount on the weight of fruit and vegetables and other 
food purchased during and after the intervention was 
assessed using weekly store sales data and consumption 
per capita was estimated.
The researchers deserve considerable credit for 
completing this challenging trial, and generating 
potentially valuable results that could be useful to 
policy makers. Benefits were mixed, modest, and 
potentially negated by unintended consequences. The 
estimated daily intake (per capita) of fresh and frozen 
fruit and vegetables at baseline was predictably very 
low, at just 90 g (37 g for fruit and 53 g for vegetables). 
WHO recommends up to 600 g per day.3 The 20% 
subsidies resulted in positive, but frustratingly small, 
absolute improvements. Overall, fruit and vegetable 
purchases increased by 13% during the intervention 
and 20% after the intervention. However, this finding 
represented an additional 18 g, barely equalling a 
quarter of an apple per day. 
Consumer education via in-store promotional 
materials appeared to increase intake by a further 
8%, but only during the discount period. This result is 
consistent with other studies4 that showed small or 
negligible effects from providing consumer information 
in both retail and fast-food settings. 
Unfortunately, the improvements in Brimblecombe 
and colleagues’ study were potentially undermined 
by a concomitant 13% increase in less healthy food 
purchases. Although bottled water purchases increased 
by 18%, sugar-sweetened beverage purchases also 
increased by 6%, from an already high baseline of 365 g 
per capita per day. Furthermore, baseline sodium intake 
of 2623 mg per capita per day (equivalent to 6·5 g salt) 
rose by approximately 8% during the intervention, 
and by 14% thereafter. Saturated fat intake rose, and 
total energy purchased also increased by 7% during 
the intervention and by 14% after the intervention. 
Quantitative modelling by ourselves and others 
suggests that such increases in salt and other adverse 
risk factors, if sustained, could result in substantial 
additional disease, potentially neutralising the headline 
benefits from increased fruit and vegetables.5
These adverse trends reflect firstly, predictable cross-
elasticities between sugar-sweetened beverages and 
other food-stuffs; and secondly, factors beyond the 
researchers’ control, notably that the stores reduced 
the prices of less healthy food by about 5%. Were these 
retailers perhaps preserving their more profitable lines?
The authors acknowledge some of these issues. They 
observe that elsewhere, bigger subsidies than were used 
in their study (up to 50%) have achieved bigger benefits, 
but that these large discounts generally have bigger 
political and practical barriers, such as opposition by an 
industry obliged to maximise profits.6 Useful suggestions 
for future trials might therefore include simultaneous 
implementation of subsidies on healthy items and price 
increases on unhealthy items, replication in diverse 
settings, and analysis of lag times and hang-over effects.
Brimblecombe and colleagues concluded that a 
20% discount can only increase fruit and vegetable 
purchases to a certain extent and that other strategies 
might be needed. Quite so. Happily, the feasibility and 
effectiveness of national policies taxing sugar and junk 






France, and Hungary.7 Other authorities now tax sugary 
drinks, including Mexico, Finland, Estonia, France, a 
growing number of US cities, and the UK (from 2018).8
The mixed and modest benefits reported here represent 
useful first steps. However, subsidies alone are clearly 
not sufficient. In addition to randomised controlled 
trials such as Brimblecombe and colleagues’ study, the 
increasingly solid evidence base underpinning public 
health nutrition is also powerfully informed by natural 
experiments, policy analyses, observational studies, and 
disease modelling. This totality of evidence suggests that 
effectively addressing poor diet could potentially halve 
the burden of non-communicable diseases, particularly 
benefiting disadvantaged communities.9,10 Optimal 
diet means substantial increases in fruit and vegetables, 
pulses, nuts, seeds, fish, seafood, olive oil, and omega-3. 
But, crucially, radical reductions in junk foods and sugary 
drinks are also needed.6–9
Past dietary strategies have failed to stem the 
ongoing obesity and non-communicable disease 
epidemics. Policy makers therefore need more powerful 
approaches. Valuable lessons come from successes in 
tobacco and alcohol control, in which comprehensive 
strategies have addressed the 3As of affordability, 
availability, and acceptability,11 and highlighted the 
effectiveness hierarchy. In other words, downstream 
preventive activities targeting individuals (such as 
one-to-one personal advice or health education) 
depend on a sustained, purposeful response,12 and 
consistently achieve small or negligible population 
benefits. Conversely, upstream policy interventions 
(eg, smoke-free legislation, alcohol minimum pricing, 
or regulations reducing salt or eliminating dietary trans 
fats) are generally more powerful, equitable, rapid, and 
cost-saving.10,13–16 These structural interventions could 
create healthier food environments for affluent and 
disadvantaged communities alike.
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